

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN LITERATURE AND THEORY FROM ROMANTICISM TO THE FIN DE SIÈCLE WITH SKETCHES OF CONTINUED INTERACTION AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM

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In the period between Romanticism and the fin de siècle, as a result of the self-conception of the subject and the consciousness of time (historical vs. modern), theory and literature became much more interwoven. This interweaving is shown in the article on the basis of examples from Friedrich Schlegel (“Gespräch über die Poesie”) and E. T. A. Hoffmann, as well as through examples from Charles Baudelaire and Friedrich Nietzsche’s “end of metaphysics,” which, with the subjectification of discourse, enabled interaction between theory and literature, and led to the relativistic methodological principles of New Historicism.

Keywords: theory and literature, romanticism, fin de siècle, end of metaphysics, New Historicism

The thesis of this article is that the increasingly conscious interaction between literature and theory from Romanticism to the fin de siècle was motivated by the modern idea of modernity. The process developed along the following lines.

The medieval meaning of the “modern” (i.e., “new” or “different”) raised doubts about everything that had seemed unchangeable and eternal. Thus every object of reflection came to be seen as prone to historical changes, which is a prerequisite for hybridization. The modern (Romantic) shift in mentality from an “esthetics of permanence” to an “esthetics of transitoriness and immanence” (Calinescu 3) is motivated by the temporal dimension implied in Descartes’ perception of the subject,¹ in his sentence “cogito, ergo sum” (“I think, therefore I am”). According to Heidegger’s interpretation, “every *ego cogito*, ‘I think’, is *cogito me cogitare*, ‘I think myself thinking’ ... Every human act of representing is ... a representation of oneself” (Heidegger 135).² The modern subject thus “himself becomes the basis and measure of all certainty and truth” (Heidegger 118).³ The

Ego's reference to the Ego as its object occurs in time, as a temporal distance between the representing and represented Ego, and forms the starting-point for the subjectivization or "literarization" of philosophical and theoretical discourse.

Crucial to its subsequent development is Kant's thesis about the *judgment of taste*: "The judgment of taste has no concept as its determining ground and is in no way a cognitive judgment, but an esthetic one."⁴ The paradox of this judgment lies in the fact that "despite its merely subjective validity, it addresses itself to *every* subject, as would be possible only if it were an objective judgment grounded on cognitive reasons."⁵ From this, Kant concludes: "The subjective principle – that is, the vague idea of the supersensible residing in us – can be merely indicated" (Kant 375, 379, 446).⁶ The esthetic experience – which, due to its irrationality, can only be expressed through *indication*; that is, rhetorical suggestion – becomes the basis of the subject's self-certainty, as well as of his esthetic articulation, in Fichte's *Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre* (1798). The "science of knowledge" as a science is grounded on a principle that is impossible to prove, but, according to Fichte, "all that is certain is such because *this sentence* is certain; and, conversely, nothing is certain if this sentence is not" (21).⁷ In this "first sentence," the basis is identified with the subject of the science of knowledge: "Anyone that has a mind to it is free to investigate what he would know if his Ego were not an Ego; that is, if it did not exist, or if he could not distinguish any non-Ego from his own Ego" (Fichte 40).⁸ Thus the subject establishes himself as different from his objects, which are encompassed in the system of knowledge. However, by the principle stated above, he also establishes the system of knowledge himself, and is thus in a way identical with his objects. In the act of self-transcendence or esthetic self-experience, he transcends this double structure, reaching a (subjective) totality. The Fichtean self-certainty thus establishes itself in both the cyclic and the linear concepts of time. As the subject's self-experience, it is a moment of "eternal present." However, if the subject is to again and again reaffirm his subjectivity, his difference from his ever-changing objects, this moment has to repeat itself in countless variants and thus reveal itself in the linear concept of time. It preserves its identity through constant modernization – that is, differentiation. As a result, it can no longer "settle" into a semantically monovalent cognitive concept and name a new "basis," one that would be more appropriate to its findings. It can only "take us . . . toward the mobility of the symbolic" (Vattimo 28); that is, to an esthetic and suggestive articulation of the esthetic experience. This articulation is labeled by Kant as "indication," whereas Fichte describes it as an identification of the form and content of the "first sentence": if the latter is to be "certain directly and in itself, this [. . . means] that its form is determined by its content, and vice versa: that its content is determined by its form" (Fichte 22).⁹

Umberto Eco explains this esthetization or "literarization" of discourse semiotically: in the domain of sign types, the signifier is practically discarded in favor of its meaning as soon as the latter is revealed. In the Romantic conception of the symbol, in contrast, the signifier only acquires its full

meaning as such; that is, through its physical presence (what Fichte calls the “form”). This is a result of the Romantic identification of symbolic activity with esthetic function: the message is directed at itself, so that it defies translation into any other sign “form” (cf. Eco 209–212). Gadamer maintains that “in every case the meaning of the *symbolon* depends on its physical presence and acquires its representative function only through the fact of its being shown or spoken.” However, it does not represent on the basis of “convention and dogmatic agreement” (Gadamer 65, 67), but through the esthetic experience; that is, subjectively (emotionally and imaginatively). For all its concreteness, it is thus not evident but infinitely interpretable: in the symbolic mode, one finds ever new and hitherto uncoded possible relations establishing themselves between the levels of expression and meaning (cf. Eco 212). The incursion of the symbolic into scientific language that occurs through the self-assertion and the far greater power of the subject over objective reality enable both the literarization of philosophical and theoretical discourse and the theorization and essayization of literary discourse. This latter phenomenon has been markedly expressed in literature since the dawn of Romanticism. Romanticism – with its descriptive systems of thinking that emphasize the value of subjectivity, from Kant’s esthetic experience to Fichte’s system of the science of knowledge – can be regarded as belonging to the modern period in the sense that, with the subjectification of thinking, it places an emphasis on the subject, on the subject’s self-conception and on the subject’s reception of time.¹⁰ It thus counts as the first modern incursion into the metaphysics of the subject from Descartes onwards, and with this it is also the period in which the basis for the modernization of new age metaphysics was created (Matajc 38, 45).

In eluding objectivist conventions, esthetic articulation accordingly brings about a change in the theoretical discourse. This is evident from the fragments published by Friedrich Schlegel in the journal *Athenäum*, as well as from his essay “Gespräch über die Poesie” (Dialogue on Poetry, 1799). The fragment is a (semi)literary form centered on the moment of utterance, so that its very nature denies the possibility of an enduring discursive system. The essayist genre of the dialogue, on the other hand, is a structure of expression well suited to the Fichtean double structure of the Romantic subject. Its characteristic simultaneity of identity and difference is described by Schlegel as follows: “Certain of finding himself again, man keeps going out of himself, so that he might seek and find, in the depths of an extraneous being, a complement to his own innermost being” (Schlegel 280).¹¹ Viewed from this aspect, Schlegel’s semiliterary fragments (“Gespräch über die Poesie” is written in the form of a dialogue, a conversation among literary figures, while the text as a whole assumes the form of a semiliterary essay) are symbolic structures: their esthetic form is the esthetic content of Romantic subjectivity. The totality towards which the Romantic subject “makes infinite progress,” and that he realizes again and again in his infinite potentiality also represents a totality of articulation: Schlegel describes this with the concept of mythology,¹² which has a cognitive function but is at the same time “one” with “poetry”:

For this is the beginning of all poetry, to lift [*aufheben*] the progression and laws of all rationally thinking reason and to place us anew into the beautiful confusion of imagination, into the original chaos of human nature, for which I know as of yet no more beautiful symbol than the confusing throng of the old gods. (Schlegel 305)¹³

Romantic cognitiveness is thus necessarily an esthetic one, and at the same time this estheticity connects through bringing together the linear and cyclical (mythic) concept of time. The romantic subject determines both, and the subject is determined by the idea – that is, the “constant self-generating exchange of two opposing thoughts” (*stets sich selbst erzeugende Wechsel zwei streitenden Gedanken*) – and it is thus static in its dynamicity and paradoxical from the viewpoint of time (Schlegel 38). With this notion, the Jena Romantic School¹⁴ consciously motivates the theorization (essayization) of poetic discourse and the poetization of theoretical discourse.

The form that opens most readily to this interaction of discourses is the (essayized, lyricized) Romantic novel, particularly as written by E. T. A. Hoffmann. Hoffmann’s narrative action can no longer close itself rationally into a single sense and an objectifying, “omniscient” explanation. Instead, all that is left to the “authorial” narrator is a mere esthetic “control” over unclear chance events (*Die Lebensansichten des Katers Murr*, 1820), unclear fate (*Die Elixiere des Teufels*, 1816; *Der Sandmann*, 1819), or unclear irrational experience (*Nusscracker und Mausekönig*, 1819). This esthetically articulated ambiguity in its turn exerts an influence on theory, namely on psychoanalysis: Sigmund Freud uses Hoffmann’s tale *Der Sandmann* to explain the concept of *das Unheimliche* (the uncanny) as something familiar yet at the same time strange, mysterious, and unusual in its unfathomability. According to Freud, the arousal of this “uncanny” feeling “requires an intellectual uncertainty whether ... the improbability [i.e., the extraordinary fulfillment of a wish, the sense of an evil power, the sense that the dead return] may not be possible after all” (Freud 272).¹⁵ This uncertainty is evoked by the contradictory structure of the Romantic subject, by the ability to alienate one’s own Ego. Such self-experience gives rise to the possibility that there may be two worlds existing side by side, one that admits a rational explanation and one that does not (i.e., one that functions as a higher power). Both possibilities remain fantastically open (in Todorov’s sense of the “fantastic”), maintaining a cognitive uncertainty without one emerging the stronger in the course of time. Hoffmann’s authorial epic subject can thus control the narrative reality (the imaginative and emotional contents of Romantic subjectivity) only by giving it an esthetic articulation; that is, by presenting it in all its paradox, in the structure of the arabesque. The arabesque is perceived by Schlegel as an “indirect mythology” (a totality of philosophy and poetry) because it reveals the same organization: the structure of the arabesque is an eminently symbolic, esthetically cognitive one – a “symmetry of contradictions, this wonderfully perennial alternation of enthusiasm and irony,” “the original chaos of human nature” (Schlegel 305).¹⁶

The circular structure of the Oriental arabesque suggests a transcendence that defies pictorial representation and can only be conveyed through

the symbolic presence of ornaments. Each ornament is autonomous, yet at the same time placed in a relationship with all others. In the circular structure of mutual relationships, the arabesque ornaments thus convey a double impression. On the one hand, they appear as the pure present moment of their simultaneity, of the identity of the arabesque as a whole. On the other hand, they appear as a multitude of differences that are established in the mutual relationships and revealed, one after the other, in the course of time. The structure of the arabesque – the simultaneous effect of the totality and the progressive, consecutive effects of these relationships – makes possible an esthetic cognitiveness whose movement is a circular one. Describing the self-certainty of the “first sentence,” Fichte was aware of this: “Here, then, is a circle that the human mind can never leave” (39).¹⁷ Hoffmann’s literature is therefore an esthetic articulation of the Romantic philosophy and theory of the esthetic subject *par excellence*.

As such it influenced Charles Baudelaire, but with a certain modification: the subject in Baudelaire’s lyric poetry and essays explicitly articulates the transcendence of time. The growing awareness of human and natural transience also heightened the transcendent value of its opposite, “eternal” beauty (i.e., form). With this process, the Romantic *das Unheimliche* likewise acquired a more explicit opposite – the entire experience of “the numinous” (the modern experience of transcendent reality, according to Rudolf Otto) is not merely “terrifying,” but fascinating as well (*mysterium tremendum et fascinans*). The numinous cannot be rationally apprehended; therefore it finds expression in literary structures that are semantically polyvalent. These preserve the highest cognitive value – all the more so because, being esthetic forms, they create or evoke the transcendence of Beauty themselves. On the other hand, the simultaneously fascinating and terrifying effect of Beauty (cf. Mihelj 67) is perhaps also heightened because Beauty reveals its *relative* transcendence.

In contrast to the Romantic concept, the Baudelairian esthetic experience is defined by a “sensuous” feeling in Schlegel’s sense of the word; that is, as “an ability to be excited by something,” “a passion that swells and abates again” (*Reizbarkeit für dieses und jenes; Leidenschaft, die schwillt und wieder sinket*; Schlegel 304) Because modern beauty is realized through a transient, excessive esthetic experience, its transcendence is only a relative one – “as ideal as it is fleeting” (*si idéal si fugitive*).¹⁸ The excessive esthetic experience is a moment of eternal present, an exit from the awareness of irreversible time. However, on the other hand, it is precisely the awareness of time that informs Baudelaire’s rational reflection on beauty (*La Beauté*). The “idea of the esthetics of modernity” implies characteristics of the avant-garde and is completely realized in Baudelaire’s artistic reflection (Matajc 18, Calinescu 41).¹⁹ Due to this double structure, Baudelaire labels modern man as *homo duplex* in his essays: Baudelaire’s conception of the subject paradoxically brings together the constant tension between progressive temporal finality (decline, decay, and death in linear time of an organic reality) and spiritual beauty of a sensory-emotional pure presentness, which returns cyclically with such logicity that it is clearly a matter

of a recognizable paradox of the (relatively) absolute subject.²⁰ This is also a characteristic of the collapse of metaphysical systems and Nietzsche's thinking: the feeling of modernity, in which progress, even in death, is all the more established as a value of its own; the paradox lies in the fact that an advancement is only an advancement when it leads to a new situation, one from which only a new advancement is possible (Vattimo 58–63). The new advancement in death and the comprehension of linear time is not possible because it means the destruction of stability, the impossibility of the simultaneous absoluteness and finality of subjectivity. Experiences of a fascinating yet anxiety-inducing transience accumulate like never-ending transit stops (*Une Charogne*). In Baudelaire's lyric poetry, they are made to point explicitly beyond themselves to a transcendence of time and eternity; that is, they are articulated through an allegorical structure, which is a new rhetorical attempt to link theoretical and literary diction. Allegory is characterized by Gadamer:

Allegory originally belonged to the sphere of talk, of the logos, and is therefore a rhetorical or hermeneutical figure. Instead of what is actually meant, something else, more tangible is said, but in such a way as to suggest the other ... The allegorical procedure of interpretation and the symbolical procedure of knowledge have the same justification: it is not possible to know the divine in any other way than by starting from the world of the senses. Nevertheless, allegory does not assume an original metaphysical relationship, such as a symbol claims but, rather, a connection created by convention and dogmatic agreement. (Gadamer 65–67)

Allegory is incapable of expressing the Romantic notion of totality; due to its rhetorical status, "it suggests a disjunction between the way in which the world appears in reality and the way it appears in language" (de Man, *Blindness* 191). In other words, it points to the difference between subject matter and its esthetic articulation. This makes it an appropriate structure of expression for the post-Romantic subject, who recognizes his division in time – the allegorical sign must refer to a sign anterior to itself:

The meaning constituted by the allegorical sign can then consist only in the *repetition* ... of a previous sign with which it can never coincide, since it is of the essence of this previous sign to be pure anteriority ... Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin. (de Man, *Blindness* 207)

Both the symbolic and allegorical structures are thus "a way of filling out the distance between the past and present – a commentary, interpretation, doubling" (Kernev Štrajn 98–99). For Nietzsche, "language is rhetoric, because it desires to convey only a *doxa* (opinion), not an *episteme* (knowledge)" (Nietzsche 107). To de Man "it seems as if Nietzsche had turned away from the problems of language to questions of the self and to the assertion of a philosophy rooted in the unmediated sense of existential pathos" (*Allegories* 106). Both the Romantic subject and the modern

Baudelairian *homo duplex* establish themselves in their relation to time, a relation informed by the modern-period idea of modernity. They do diverge on one point. The Fichtean Ego stresses the identity of the Ego with the non-Ego, consequently advocating a symbolic articulation of the esthetic experience; the modern *homo duplex*, by contrast, stresses their difference, employing an allegorical articulation for the purpose. Through the allegorical structure, he compares (*comme*) two separate levels, the levels of esthetic articulation and of its subject-matter, of eternity and transience. Still, both approaches are concerned with esthetic cognitiveness and thus the esthetic articulation of man's relation to time.

The paradoxical self-certainty of the Romantic subject, and with it the interaction between literary and philosophical and theoretical discourse, is developed most consistently in Nietzsche's emphatic reflection on the collapse of metaphysical systems and on the paradox of the idea of modernity: "Nietzsche finds it impossible to escape from history, and he finally has to bring the two incompatibles, history and modernity ... together in a paradox that cannot be resolved" (de Man, *Blindness* 150).

Relativity is established through the structure of Nietzsche's articulation: through a juxtaposition of fragments whose meanings are mutually exclusive.²¹ Due to this technique, the concepts of the "will to power" and "superman" cannot be reduced to single meanings – they are no longer the foundations of a system. In this respect, Heidegger wrote about Nietzsche:

As a truth about entities as a whole, Nietzsche's metaphysics has the will to power as its "object" ... However, since the will to power represents the fundamental nature of entities as a whole, it also determines the essence of man. As this determining factor, the will to power is the foundation of metaphysics, [therefore also] its *subiectum*. (Heidegger 78)²²

Nietzsche's man is thus both the subject and object of the will to power, eternally annihilating this difference and, with it, his identity. He is a "superman" (*Übermensch*), who "exists as a transition beyond man and is thus himself this transition. He raises what is now in existence – himself – beyond himself, transcends himself. As his former self, he is always in the process of disintegration because he is losing the 'form' of that self – the form is changing, passing" (Urbančič 402).

It is passing from the viewpoint of modernity, whose recurring newness, according to Nietzsche, always implies what has preceded it, but without a recognizable foundation. Thus it presages Lacan's rhetorical process²³ in which the essence of subject or language is missed: gliding of signifiers past the signified, a process that does establish the subject (in the course of time) but prevents him from settling into an essence or system.²⁴ Nietzsche's esthetic articulation, which is likewise incapable of settling into a discursive conceptual system, is the semi-literary form of the essayist fragment. This form reaches its peak in his *Also Sprach Zarathustra*. A string of open-ended stories, interspersed with lyric poems, this work is no longer mere interaction, but a pure syncretism of philosophical and literary discourse: an indefinable hybrid genre of modernity. Nietzsche's "open system" was

put into force as a method only with New Historicism and, specifically, two of its principles: just as Nietzsche in the comprehension of time (i.e., history and modernity) and the (recognizing) subject (the superman as the subject and object of the will to power) finds himself requiring metaphysics, so, too, are the new historicists aware “that every act of unmasking, critique and opposition uses the tools it condemns and risks falling prey to the practice it exposes” and “that literary and non-literary texts circulate inseparably” (Veeser xi). With this principle there is finally an identical handling of texts that are theoretical and literary at the same time: a symptom of the end of modernity, of the metaphysics of time, and the subject that can no longer differentiate between the recognizing and the recognized subject.

Translated by Nada Grošelj and Jason Blake

NOTES

¹ The term *subject* is used here in its (one of its possible) philosophical senses; namely, in the sense of a recognizing subject as being different from the recognized object. The expression stems from the 16th century and is derived from the Latin word *subjectum*, the past participle of *subicere* ‘to throw under’, meaning the theme of the sentence (cf. Inwood 280).

² Author’s translation. German original: »Jedes ego cogito ist cogito *me* cogitare ... Jedes menschliche Vor-stellen ist nach einer leicht missdeutbaren Redeweise ein Sich-vorstellen.«

³ The original: »... wird zu dem von ihm selbst gesetzten Grund und Mass für alle Gewissheit und Wahrheit.«

⁴ Author’s translation. German original: »... das Geschmacksurteil aber gründet sich gar nicht auf Begriff, und ist überall nicht Erkenntnis, sondern nur ein ästhetisches Urteil.«

⁵ »... ob es gleich bloß subjective Gültigkeit hat, es dennoch alle Subjekte so in Anspruch nimmt, als es nur immer geschehen könnte, wenn es ein objektives Urteil wäre.«

⁶ »Das subjektive Prinzip, nämlich die unbestimmte Idee des Übersinnlichen in uns, kann nur ... angezeigt ... werden.«

⁷ Author’s translation. German original: »Alles was gewiß ist, ist gewiß, weil *er* [i.e., der erster Satz] gewiß ist; und es ist nichts gewiß, wenn *er* nicht gewiß ist.«

⁸ »Wer Lust dazu hat, mag immer untersuchen, was er wissen würde, wenn sein Ich nicht Ich wäre, d. i., wenn er nicht existierte, und kein Nicht-Ich von seinem Ich unterscheiden könnte.«

⁹ »... soll unmittelbar und durch sich selbst gewiß sein, und das kann nicht anders heißen, als daß der Gehalt desselben seine Form, und umgekehrt die Form desselben seinen Gehalt bestimme.«

¹⁰ The perception of time as a major sensation in an epic first appears in Lessing’s *Laokoon* as well as in works within the pre-Romantic sentimental movement, in Sterne and Fielding, who forecast the romantic perception of the subject and of modernity. Cf. von Wilpert (858).

¹¹ Author’s translation. German original: »Darum geht der Mensch, sicher sich selbst immer wieder zu finden, immer von neuem aus sich heraus, um die Ergänzung seines innersten Wesens in der Tiefe eines fremden zu suchen und zu finden.«

¹² »Die Philosophie gelangte in wenigen kühnen Schritten dahin, sich selbst und den Geist des Menschen zu verstehen, in dessen Tiefe sie den Urquell der Phantasie und das Ideal der Schönheit entdeckte und so die Poesie deutlich anerkennen mußte, deren Wesen und Dasein sie bisher auch nicht geahndet hatte ... Aber die höchste Schönheit, ja die höchste Ordnung ist denn doch nur die des Chaos, nämlich eines solchen, welches nur auf die Berührung der Liebe wartet, um sich zu einer harmonischen Welt zu entfalten, eines solchen wie es auch die alte Mythologie und Poesie war. Denn Mythologie und Poesie, beide sind eins und unzertrennlich... Die Mythologie ist ein solches Kunstwerk der Natur. In ihrem Gewebe ist das Höchste wirklich gebildet; alles ist Beziehung und Verwandlung, angebildet und umgebildet, und dieses Anbilden und Umbilden eben ihr eigentümliches Verfahren, ihr inneres Leben« (Schlegel 295, 301–02, 305).

¹³ »Denn das ist der Anfang aller Poesie, den Gang und die Gesetze der vernünftigen denkenden Vernunft aufzuheben und uns wieder in die schöne Verwirrung der Phantasie, in das ursprüngliche Chaos der menschlicher Natur zu versetzen, für das ich kein schöneres Symbol bis jetzt kenne, als das bunte Gewimmel der alten Götter.«

¹⁴ The early Romantic movement congregated around the journal *Athenäum* (1798–1800) and included the literary theorists and historians August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel (the latter was also a writer), the poet and writer Friedrich von Hardenberg Novalis, the writer and translator Ludwig Tieck, and the philosophers Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Schelling, and Schleiermacher.

¹⁵ Author's translation. German original: »... ist der Urteilsstreit erforderlich, ob das überwindene Unglaubwürdige nicht doch real möglich ist.«

¹⁶ »Symmetrie von Widersprüchen, dieser wunderbare ewige Wechsel von Enthusiasmus und Ironie,« »das ursprüngliche Chaos der menschlichen Natur.«

¹⁷ »Also ist hier ein Zirkel, aus dem der menschliche Geist nie herausgehen kann.«

¹⁸ More specifically: "Modernity is the transitory, the fugitive ... the half of art, of which the other half is the eternal and the immutable" (Baudelaire 296; translated by Calinescu 48).

¹⁹ In the 1848 article « *Plastique et Civilisation – Du beau Antique et du Beau Moderne* » Gautier describes the esthetics of the ugly (Calinescu 45, 46): the ugliness of modern industry and urban life is transformed into artistic beauty. Thus, there is an appropriating of the Romantic, Hoffmannesque (from the viewpoint of the absolute esthetic subject) subjectivizing of objective reality by means of the grotesque.

²⁰ "Baudelaire's *modernité*, both as defined theoretically and as applied to the works of Constantin Guys (*The Painter of Modern Life*; 1863), embodies the paradoxes of a time awareness so strikingly new and so rich and refined, that it can be judged a qualitative turning point in the history of modernity as an idea" (Calinescu 49).

²¹ For example: "man is above the beasts and below them" (Nietzsche 559). The will to power is "man's will as a subject that is primarily the subject of the will to power and simultaneously – and for that very reason – a self-exceeding subject" (Kos 49). As a superman he lives as a surpassing of man and such that he is that very surpassing (Urbančič 402).

²² »Die Metaphysik Nietzsches ist einmal jene, die als Wahrheit über das Seiende im Ganzen den Willen zum Macht zu ihrem 'Objekt' hat... Als diese liegt er der menschlichen Prägung der Wahrheit über das Seiende im Ganzen, d.h. der Metaphysik, zum Grunde, ist ihr subiectum.«

²³ « Reportons sur ce schéma le *je pense* cartésien. Assurément la distinction de l'énonciation à l'énoncé est ce qui en fait le glissement toujours possible, et si

l'on peut dire le point d'achoppement éventuel Disons que c'est de prendre sa place au niveau de l'énonciation qui donne sa certitude au *cogito* ... La différence du statut que donne au sujet la dimension découverte de l'inconscient freudien tient au désir, qui est à situer au niveau du *cogito*. Tout ce qui anime, ce dont parle toute énonciation, c'est du désir » (Lacan 157).

²⁴ "This modality of significance we call *semiotic*, in order to convey ..., the distinctive mark, the trace, the index, the premonitory sign, the proof, the incised mark, the imprint, in short, a *distinctiveness*. This distinctiveness is capable of an uncertain and indeterminate articulation, as with children it does not yet refer, and in psychotic discourse it no longer refers to a signified object for a thetic consciousness... The term *semiotic* makes it sufficiently clear that it is a modality avowedly heterogeneous to meaning, but always aspiring to, negating, or exceeding meaning... When we turn to a *signifying practice* – that is, to a socially communicable discourse such as poetic language – this semiotic heterogeneity remains, of course, inseparable from the *symbolic* function of significance. Symbolic is here understood in opposition to semiotic as referring to the inevitability of meaning, sign, and signified object for the transcendental ego. Language as a social practice always presupposes these two modalities, and the ways in which they combine constitute different *types of discourse* or signifying practices. For example, scientific discourse, which aspires to the status of a metalanguage, tends to minimize the semiotic element" (Kristeva 156).

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