

Research as Reading: From the Close Reading of Difference to the Distant Reading of Distance

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Insofar as the reading of literary artworks is increasingly limited to literary criticism, any study of reading of such works is a study of critical, that is, close reading. Yet even within criticism, close reading has been rejected by distant reading, which enables, precisely by way of this rejection, both the reading of uncanonised texts, neglected by close reading, and a new reading of the canon itself.

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Today, literary critics tell us that they remain the only readers of literary works of art. They tend to state this as an argument for the conclusion that criticism should be reconstructed.¹ I will draw a much more modest conclusion, one that only concerns the question of reading (and that may as such, nonetheless, touch on the big issue of reconstruction): if it is true that critics are the only readers – and why would they say it if it were not? – then any study of reading should be a study of critical reading. From this point of view, it becomes obvious that the critics' statement, gloomy as it may appear, is even optimistic. For Franco Moretti, one of the most influential critics today, openly encourages his own colleagues, the supposed only remaining readers, to omit reading literary texts. Granted, Moretti discards here a specific practice of critical reading, the close reading of canonical texts, but as, for him, close reading 'has radiated from the cheerful town of New Haven over the whole field of literary studies' ('The Slaughterhouse' 208), by close reading, he really means reading.

I wish to suggest that with this absolute negation of reading, the ongoing marginalisation of reading reaches its climax – and hence its dialectical turn. Moretti forsakes the close reading of the Western canon not for non-reading, but for the so-called distant reading of the history of formal differentiation of world literature. He relies on quantitative history's

graphs, geography's maps and evolutionary biology's trees to delineate respectively time, space and, finally, chronotopes of those formal elements that overdetermine the genres that in turn overdetermine world literature. These so-called 'abstract models' (*Graphs* 2, 8) that replace close reading with distant reading become concrete strategies if observed from the viewpoint that inverts the spontaneous notion of the relation between the abstract and the concrete. The viewpoint is of course Hegel's, and its elaboration for historical analysis of Moretti's kind can be found in Marx's 'Introduction' to the *Grundrisse*.

Of literary maps, Moretti himself writes 'you *reduce* the text to a few elements, and *abstract* them from the narrative flow, and construct a new, *artificial* object like these maps [...]. And with a little luck, these maps will be *more than the sum of their parts*: they will possess "emerging" qualities, which were not visible on the lower level' (*Graphs* 53). So when he claims that 'before indulging in speculations at a more abstract level, we must learn to share the significant facts of literary history across our specialized niches' ('More' 75), this should be read as a call for a move from academically, institutionally delimited, abstract, close readings of real objects to their concretisation by way of constructing, across institutionalised epistemological obstacles, an object of knowledge; it is only after such a move that 'indulging in speculations' can be discarded as remaining 'at a more abstract level'.

Hence the dialectic of distant reading; and the overdetermining character of the analysed infra- and supra-textual elements. Consider the final and most complex case study in his five-year series of attempts to grasp the world literary system. Moretti's construction of an evolutionary tree of free indirect style (*Graphs* 81–92) can be seen as a concretisation of Bakhtin's close reading of Dostoevsky. For Bakhtin, Dostoevsky uses free indirect style and similar devices in order to stage the polyphony of perspectives. As such, he is supposed to be the heir of Socratic dialogues and other carnivalised genres; the alternative to his contemporary, Tolstoy; and a precursor of a polyphony to come. Today, a rigorous materialist account of such a *longue durée* could argue that this polyphony to come has already come in the form of the reactionary multicultural *mésalliance* of carnival and monophony (Breznik 249–254); that among the humble predecessors of this symbiosis is precisely the monologue of Socratic dialogues (Barthes 178);² and that one of this account's own precursors is Tolstoy's historiography of the infinitesimal (Lotman 224; Rancière 33–34).

Such an account of polyphony might rely also on Moretti's tree compared to which Bakhtin's Dostoevsky appears quite abstract. Moretti understands free indirect style as the narrativisation of ideological interpella-

tion of individuals in modern, bourgeois societies. Dostoevsky becomes then part of the history of modernity, not a quilting point between the supposedly pre-ideological, carnivalesque past and the post-ideological, polyphonic future.

According to the tree, from Austen to Flaubert and Zola, free indirect style progressively closes the gap between the character and the narrator. After this saturation, the antagonism between the individual and the social reemerges as the device moves to Dostoevsky's Russia. A closure, yet not without antagonism, follows when free indirect style returns to Europe, yet this time around to Verga's Sicilian, unconsolidated region. And the character and the narrator separate once more along the core/periphery axis with estrangements of the objective in European high modernism and of the subjective in Latin American, say, Vargas Llosa's, 'dictator novels'.

Instead of unrelated deconstructive close readings (which would, moreover, hardly deem Verga's or even Vargas Llosa's style worthy of being deconstructed), we get a process whose dialectic is materially articulated onto geography: modern interpellation is recognised and reified in the nineteenth-century core of the world-system; questioned as such in the modernising Russia; only partially restored in the European southern semi-periphery; and then problematised again in the initial Western European core and in the hitherto passive Latin American periphery, both of which have by now, in the American century, become semi-peripheral. Distant reading, however, is designed to travel the distance not merely between Austen and Vargas Llosa, but also between Austen and Amelia Opie, between Vargas Llosa and David Viñas. It is not meant to (de)construct the canon, but to see it as just one of the potential outcomes of literary history, the one that has become the actual one for the reasons that make for the laws of literary history. It is against the backdrop of the unrealised potentialities, the 'boring' inertia of forms (*Atlas* 150), that the canonised texts are read. This renders interesting not only 'boredom', but – an even more difficult task – the canon itself, which suddenly poses anxiety-ridden questions such as 'How does a new narrative form crystallize out of a collection of haphazard, half-baked, often horrendous attempts?' (Ibid.)

This is evident in Moretti's other central case study employing the tree, namely his archaeology of the subgenres of the detective story that have remained mere uncanonised potentialities due to Conan Doyle's victorious use of the device of clues (*Graphs* 70–78; 'The Slaughterhouse' 212–223). Clues introduced by Doyle as signs of truth – rather than of the depicted detective's brilliance, of the criminal's depravity, of technological progress, of the correspondences with the transcendent or of nothing at all ('The Slaughterhouse' 223n17, 216n10) – are clearly an event. They

introduce modern science in a situation, the genre of detective fiction, which allows only for bourgeois individualism, moralism, determinism, obscurantism or plain redundancy. This is why they remain unnoticed as a revolutionary ‘jump’ (225) by Doyle’s competition – and even by Doyle himself: they serve (the truth within) the plot, not Doyle’s ‘myth of Sherlock Holmes’ (215). Far from remaining, like coke or the violin, an ‘attribute’ (*ibid.*), a fetish object, of Holmes, they are the subject-supposed-to-know that makes the ‘bourgeois’ (212n7) detective a subject of truth. And they are seen as such only by the ‘blind canon makers’ (210, 211), the contemporary readers, whose choice of Doyle over everyone else is an act of subjectivation, of fidelity to the event. This choice of ‘form’ (211), plot, over ‘boredom’, myth, also explains why Doyle’s own choices can be seen by Moretti as ‘making fewer errors early on, when the problems are simpler – and more errors later, when they are more complex’ (215). These readers then serve as subject-supposed-to-know for the next generations of readers, who read (and consequently canonise) Doyle simply because the previous generation is said to have read him. Unlike the ‘blind’ readers, subsequent generations make the choice offered to them by the market informed by hearsay, the ‘information cascade’ (210–211), the symbolic Other itself – and not the choice made by the formal ‘paradigm shift’ (215), the void, the unknown of the Other.

But the event of naming the truth of the situation – the event of enacting the ‘salient aspect of a historical transformation’, namely, ‘the impact of rationalisation over adventures’ (‘The End’ 74n11) – is betrayed not only by its own situation and by subsequent canonisation, but even by science. Moretti maintains that the motive of these ‘blind canon makers’ is a ‘blind spot’ (‘The Slaughterhouse’ 211, 218) of economic analyses of the cultural commodity market, and a ‘black box’ (‘The End’ 75) of literary history itself. ‘[T]he event that starts the “information cascade” is unknowable.’ (‘The Slaughterhouse’ 211) One of the commentators readily suggests cognitive science as the answer; Moretti expresses openness to this kind of suggestions (‘The End’ 75), but does not actually proceed in that direction. It seems that precisely by keeping the question unanswered and not taking the path of a cognitivist or any other kind of rationalisation of the event, Moretti’s project in effect remains falsifiable and thereby scientific.

Thus, the dialectic of unity and asymmetry that makes world literature ‘one-and-unequal’ (‘Conjectures’ 66; see also 55–56, 64), a system, is formalised best by trees. Trees can uncover relations between seemingly unrelated actualities as well as potentialities overshadowed by actualities; that is, they can shed new light not only on relations within the canon, but also on peripheral literary forms that were marginalised by the canon

as a whole. In the first case, the trees reconstruct the diversification of units (such as the device of free indirect style), in the second, the opposite process (illustrated by the tree of clues). In the initial proposal of distant reading, these two processes were divided between diversifying, nation-like trees and unifying, market-like waves ('Conjectures' 66–68); it seems that now this difference is reflected in the tree itself, which can now show both kinds of processes. Yet this should by no means be taken as a revision, yielding to the many critiques of the initial 'Conjectures'. If anything, the new trees highlight even more complexly – that is, more concretely in Hegel's and Marx's sense – the core/periphery relation between such actualities as Austen and Vargas Llosa, or, say, the market mechanisms that render non-Doylean clues mere potentialities. These trees can be even more readily deployed in Moretti's (68) initial struggle against the study of literatures as particularistic national and even local identities.

This dialectic, and the consequent critique of identity politics, are effectively the targets of the critiques of distant reading mentioned above (the early cases are addressed by Moretti in 'More'). For from the standpoint of the targets themselves, one might claim that these critiques pertain to the identity politics of recognition based, as Rastko Močnik shows, on a misreading of the Hegelian dialectic of *Anerkennung* (Močnik 183–184, 188–199). For Hegel, an identity statement ($A = A$) is inevitably recognised as self-contradictory, lacking the difference between its subject and predicate. The predicate under which contemporary post-political identity groups subsume themselves as subjects does differ from them, but it is postulated abstractly, in terms borrowed from the ruling ideology, rather than developed by means of any conceptual thought. That is, these groups identify themselves as subjects of human rights and cultural life-styles, not as members of a class or of one of two sexes. In a word, they identify themselves as (life-style, gender, ethnic, religious) identities, not as subjects (of class struggle or the unconscious). Consequently, their identity hinges on recognition by the ideology from which their predicate is borrowed.

This ideology is reproduced in reproaches to distant reading for considering language abstractly, for failing to recognise the particularity of each language and relying solely on philological studies that are second-hand (and written in English: Arac 40). Here, a dialectical and non-identitary reply would be that distant reading refers to second-hand studies precisely so as to articulate their object, a given local literature, onto the object of world literary system analysis. Distant reading takes the risk of reading extra-textual devices and genres (and secondary literature written in English) in order not to be limited, like close reading, to reading (primary) literature written in English.

Distant reading has been criticised for reducing the particularity of every culture to its position in a binary *dispositif* of core and periphery. Yet with all their embeddedness in critical theory, the critiques do not seem to be engaged in deconstructing the dichotomy, in arguing somehow that the distinction favours the core, while resting on periphery – they simply try to prove that the cultures they identify with are not peripheral. Instead of deconstructing the canon, they seek canonical recognition of their local literatures. They act as if core and periphery were words of ordinary language, not concepts of the world-systems analysis, a theory of cores exploiting peripheries – a deconstructionist *faux pas* if ever there was one, especially since ordinary language reproduces the ruling ideology, in this case, the politics of recognition of peripheries by the core.

So, deconstruction is what critiques of distant reading preach – and what they are prone to. And it is also what they neglect: they miss Moretti's own 'deconstructive' use of the dichotomy. Moretti does start by claiming that the novel's expansion as adaptation to an external influence is characteristic of peripheries, while the spontaneous expansion is characteristic of the core. But he does it in order to be able to demonstrate that the former is the rule, not the latter ('Conjectures' 60–61). He effectively introduces the rule/exception opposition and, projecting it on the core/periphery dyad, ends up with a more concrete relation between the periphery-as-the-rule and the core-as-the-exception. And in the final analysis ('More' 79–80), he shows that spontaneity is not merely exceptional, but nonexistent, since the expansion of the novel is always, even in the core, the result of a compromise. He thus implies that cores are specific merely insofar as they are not only results of compromises with expanding forms, but also sources of expansion in their own right. The barring of spontaneity does not lead then to multicultural relativism: the difference between the core and the periphery holds, it is just that it lies in a form's position within the system rather than in its genesis; what counts is where a form is in relation to the core, not whether or not it emerged spontaneously.

Similarly, Moretti, unlike postcolonial studies, approaches Jameson from the standpoint of materialist theory rather than the politics of recognition. He treats as a law of literary history Jameson's intuition of expansion being a result of a compromise between a foreign form and local material. What the critiques miss, however, is that Moretti goes on to add a local form to the pair ('Conjectures' 65). By suggesting that the latter is destabilised by a foreign form, he conceptualises it as overdetermined, doubly inscribed: as local, the local form is determined by material, and as a form, by the foreign – the latter determination being overdetermination, since the foreign form determines not only the local form, but also the

local material that in turn determines the local form. This form is hence a condensation, a symptom, of the asymmetry of the compromise: the instability of the local form (say, the narrator) betrays the subordination of the local and the material to the foreign and the form (say, of the local character to a foreign plot: 62n23).

The critiques of distant reading are therefore presented with a deconstruction of the core/periphery couplet in their very target, and one that affirms their local cultures better than they themselves do. For as this target treats these cultures as exploited by the core, it certainly does more than simply pitch them as part of the canon – as if the canon were not, like contemporary identity statements, dependent on ideological, rather than scientific, recognition. According to Moretti, the ideology is that of the average reader (that is, as the tree of clues tells us, the market): ‘Readers, not professors, make canons: academic decisions are mere echoes of a process that unfolds fundamentally outside the school: reluctant rubber-stamping, not much more.’ (‘The Slaughterhouse’ 209)

This attack on distant reading is then clearly not a defence of close reading. And it is a defence of neither deconstructionism nor philology. A decade after Moretti’s plea for the distant reading of world literature, some of the most influential thinkers on the cultural and theoretical Left are rejecting close reading in favour of historical materialism, while CompLit critiques of Moretti culminate, say, in Holquist’s (81) casual dismissal of distant reading in the name of Jakobsonian philology.³ Distant reading can indeed be charged with ripping close reading (‘a theological exercise’; ‘secularized theology’: ‘Conjectures’ 57; ‘The Slaughterhouse’ 208) – but not Jakobson’s poetics. On the contrary, the ‘jumps’ reconstructed by Moretti through quantitative analyses of their ‘boring’ situation activate precisely what Roman Jakobson calls the ‘orientation on the expression’ (Jakobson, ‘Noveishaya’ 305) and, later on, the ‘poetic function of language’, which ‘*projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination*’ (Jakobson, ‘Closing’ 71). Recall the trees: geographic dislocation of free indirect style is viewed as the vehicle of the device’s deautomatisation; and clues are grasped as that which activates the poetic function of the language of detective stories. Jakobson is ignored not by distant reading, but by none other than the multiculturalism that is rejecting distant reading.⁴ Even in his recent hard-core quantitative study, Moretti maintains that ‘formal analysis is [...] what any new approach – quantitative, digital, evolutionary, whatever – must prove itself against’ (‘Style’ 154).

This is the point of Jakobson’s (in)famous pun that literary study without formal analysis is as random as an arrest without clues: ‘[T]he subject of literary scholarship is not literature, but literariness, i.e. that which

makes a given work literary. However, literary historians have been so far very much like the police, who in their goal to arrest a certain person take, just to make sure, also everyone and everything in the flat as well as casual passers-by.' (Jakobson, 'Noveishaya' 305; my translation) It is precisely this pun that is being rejected by much of the current comparative literary scholarship that is also dismissing distant reading. This double rejection becomes clear as soon as one realises that formal analysis of Jakobson's or Moretti's kind can hardly corroborate the current scholarly pleas to recognise local literatures and cultures as unique identities, independent of any world-systemic overdetermination; in most cases, rigorous formal analysis simply cannot confirm that these identities are independent and as such worthy of canonisation, as these pleas would have it.

Local literary facts that are supposed to refute Moretti's core/periphery model and/or Jakobson's definition of poetic function of language bring me to my final point: identity ideology is an epistemological obstacle to understanding falsification. Not only is it in Althusser's materialist epistemology ideology, and not theory, that which is eternal (159–160), but even in Popper's liberal epistemology a claim is theoretical precisely insofar as it is falsifiable (113, 92), and for Feyerabend, theory is no less than unfalsifiable by facts, since it is refutable solely by a stronger theory (29–31, 65–66, 303). Thus, falsifiability is good news for a theory, and its falsification is good news for theory as such, since falsification of a theory merely means the advent of an even stronger, more concrete theorisation of 'facts'. The strength of a theory increases in proportion with the theory's falsifiability, and drops to zero the moment falsifiability is actualised in falsification by a stronger theory. This is the dialectic that Moretti is effectively designating when he agrees with Popper that 'the value of a theory is in direct proportion to its improbability' (Moretti, *Signs* 23). And this is what critiques of distant reading are neglecting when they try to falsify it by bringing in not concepts, but facts about particular cultural identities.

The barring of the core-as-spontaneity is a case in point. Moretti is indeed reminded, by Jale Parla ('The Object' 117, 120–121) and Jonathan Arac ('Anglo-Globalism?' 38), that even a central author like Fielding admitted the influence of Cervantes. But the reason he accepts this critique of his equation of core and spontaneous expansion is that it reminds him of a possible theoretical, not empirical, objection: the materialist theories of form as compromise ('More' 79; 'The End' 73).

Returning to Althusser, one may add that the belief in the power of facts to falsify theories depends on a disavowal of the difference between a real object and an object of knowledge. For a decade now, Moretti has been reminding his (potential) critics that distant reading is supposed to

conceptualise a new object of knowledge, the world literary system, and not simply deny the existence of particular local literatures. And although virtually every critique of distant reading starts by citing his initial suggestion that ‘world literature is not an object, [but] a *problem*’ (‘Conjectures’ 55), they all continue by bombarding the theory with individual cases purporting to show the singularity of local identities. It is no wonder then that he had to reiterate the point even in his recent quantitative analysis of *Hamlet* (‘Network’), which, incidentally, elaborates on, rather than falsifies, his far from quantitative interpretation of Elizabethan and Jacobean tragedy (*Signs* 42–82) written more than three decades ago.

Halfway through this (anti-)distant reading decade, however, Moretti (‘The End’ 71, 86) abandoned the methodological debate on distant reading for distant reading itself. This makes sense insofar as a theoretical construction of an object of knowledge cannot be naturalised into a method. Constructedness, non-givenness, of an object of knowledge thus makes any purely methodological debate pre-theoretical. But it also makes the debate on theory constitutive of theory, since a theorisation of an object of knowledge cannot verify itself simply by referring pre-theoretically to a given real object. Moretti limits the power of falsification to theory (and gets ample criticism from CompLit theorists for it); this is why his refusal of the elegant methodological debate in favour of a prosaic empirical analysis (at the end of ‘The End’) should be read as a refusal of an abstract ideological practice in favour of a concrete theoretical practice of constructing an object of knowledge out of a real object.

This can finally serve as a reflection on my own practice of commenting on distant reading. Insofar as I have succeeded in contributing to a theoretical legitimisation of the theory of distant reading, I have at once managed to legitimate my reading of the theoretical, and not practical, aspects of distant reading – making through this reflection my practice a theoretical practice, one that is able to reflect on precisely on its own practical dimension. I have argued that, far from returning to close reading, critiques of distant reading are very much in the present, interpellated by the politics of recognition, the ideology of contemporary (semi-)peripheral societies. They reproduce, rather than analyse, this ideology. As such, these responses to Moretti’s analysis of cores and (semi-)peripheries are always-already potentially analysed by their addressee: as soon as they are uttered they retroactively become the object of this analysis of (central and) (semi-)peripheral ideologies. In this respect, my critique of these critiques of distant reading is, I hope, already a positive contribution, albeit at a zero-degree, to the criticised analysis of cultural cores and (semi-)peripheries.

NOTES

1 In a recent attempt at reconstruction of literary criticism, Marko Juvan notes, 'from the last third of the nineteenth century onwards, intellectuals were required to systematically learn about the artists of their national languages in school in order to accumulate cultural capital and strengthen national awareness. However, after leaving school, only a few among them [...] remained active readers and admirers of high literature. [...] Today literature is obviously losing this special charm and is increasingly merging into public discourse crowded with print and electronic media' (Juvan *Literary* 178–179). And it is with reconstruction in mind that Marjorie Perloff (182) speaks, in response to the 1993 ACLA report, of the undergraduate 'who has read precious little of that "high" literature in elementary and secondary school', and of 'the retrenchment and attrition of graduate programs'.

2 At a certain point, Bakhtin himself ('K pererabotke' 309–310) says that Socratic dialogue is in effect monologic.

3 The self-assured brevity of Holquist's dismissal can be read as a saturation of such older critiques as, say, Gayatri Spivak's, Emily Apter's, and Jonathan Arac's: Spivak (107–109n1) downgrades distant reading to a source of reference tools for, and hence an object of critique of, close reading; Apter (256, 280–281) suggests Spitzerian transnational philology as a counterweight to distant reading; and Arac (35) sees in distant reading no less than a case of globalisation-friendly theory, which disregards the singularity of language and hence of literary criticism.

4 That is, the ideology that is reproduced even in Holquist's (85, 94) defence of Jakobson against Moretti, portraying as it is Jakobson as an advocate of minor literatures and a demystifier of truth as mere language.

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